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FREEING THE GUILTY WITHOUT PROTECTING THE INNOCENT
 A recent thoughtful article by Tim Bakken discusses the plight of innocent 
defendants and proposes new procedures to prevent “factually” innocent defendants 
from being convicted at trial.1 Bakken quite rightly draws attention to the important 
subject of preventing the conviction of innocent persons—a fundamental goal of the 
criminal justice system. In proposing his prescribed solutions, however, Bakken 
stands on shakier ground. His untested and unprecedented proposals seem quite 
likely to free countless guilty defendants without doing much to aid the truly 
innocent. Indeed, by overwhelming the criminal justice system with frivolous claims 
of innocence, Bakken’s proposal seems likely to swell the size of the criminal justice 
haystack of purportedly innocent defendants, thus making it more difficult to 
identify the needle of the truly innocent defendant enmeshed in the system. To truly 
help the innocent, we should be looking at other, more discriminating reforms that 
offer better prospects of separating guilty from innocent defendants.
 Part I of this article raises questions about Bakken’s proposal. Bakken has 
provided inadequate safeguards to keep guilty suspects from taking advantage of the 
special procedures designed for those with reasonable claims of innocence, as a 
hypothetical case clearly illustrates. For example, the requirement of an affidavit 
from a defense attorney attesting to a plausible claim of innocence seems unlikely to 
prevent most guilty defendants from raising such an argument.
 Once the f loodgates are open to raising claims of innocence, the procedural 
changes Bakken proposes would become real obstacles to effective law enforcement. 
For example, Bakken’s requirement that prosecutors must conduct an “adequate” 
investigation will drain substantial resources from the courts to litigate such claims 
and from prosecutors who would be forced to protectively reinvestigate the cases of 
guilty defendants—resources not devoted to determining whether the defendant is 
actually guilty or innocent, but instead determining whether the prosecutor has 
investigated the question enough. This hijacking of judicial and investigative 
resources to evaluate what are likely to be countless frivolous cases of “innocence” 
pleas will surely mean that the other cases left in the system will receive less 
attention—including cases of truly innocent defendants.
 Similarly problematic is Bakken’s plan to change the burden of proof for those 
who plead innocent from the current beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to that of 
“moral certainty” or “absolute certainty.” This change would make it essentially 
impossible for prosecutors to establish guilt in a criminal trial. As a result, innumerable 
guilty defendants would be freed simply because prosecutors could not satisfy the 
new and novel requirement. These and other changes suggested by Bakken 
accordingly pose extreme risks, particularly given the way the “criminal justice 
funnel”2 currently operates with large numbers of criminals escaping conviction even 
under current procedures.
1. Tim Bakken, Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: Beyond the Adversarial System, 41 U. 
Mich. J.L. Reform 547 (2008).
2. See infra pp. 1078–79.
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 Given that Bakken’s proposals seem misguided, is there anything that can 
reasonably be done to reduce wrongful convictions? Part II of this article attempts to 
answer this important question, tentatively offering some reform proposals that 
attend more carefully to the trade-offs between preventing the conviction of the 
innocent while permitting conviction of the guilty.
 Proceeding from the perspective of “innocentrism” (that is, the idea that 
exoneration of the “innocent” ought to be privileged over other values in the criminal 
justice system), I suggest eight proposals for reform: (1) researching the frequency 
and causes of wrongful conviction; (2) allowing waiver of rights for greater freedom 
to raise post-conviction innocence claims (Professor Gross’s proposal in this 
symposium3); (3) improving the implementation of existing rules on disclosing 
exculpatory evidence; (4) increasing resources for defense counsel and prosecutors to 
focus on issues relating to actual innocence; (5) abolishing the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule; (6) replacing the Miranda regime with a system of videotaping 
custodial interrogation; (7) barring prisoners from filing for habeas relief without a 
colorable claim of actual innocence; and (8) requiring defense attorneys to directly 
ask their clients if they are actually innocent. These discriminating proposals offer a 
far greater prospect of providing help to the innocent without blocking conviction of 
the guilty. A common theme underlying many of them is that they reorient the focus 
of the criminal justice system away from procedural issues and toward substantive 
issues of guilt or innocence. Sadly, Bakken’s proposals seem to offer too much 
procedure and not enough substance, a recipe for helping the guilty. The truly 
innocent will benefit in a system that values substance over procedure.
I. PROTECTING THE INNOCENT BY MAKING IT HARDER TO CONVICT THE GUILTY
 Can we come up with procedural reforms that offer greater protection to the 
innocent without hampering conviction of the guilty? That is the thorny challenge 
that Professor Bakken boldly tackles. Unfortunately, his suggested reforms myopically 
focus on preventing the conviction of the innocent, not fully appreciating the 
countervailing risk of blocking prosecution of the guilty.
 A. Bakken’s Proposed Innocence Procedures
 It may be useful to briefly describe the new procedures that Professor Bakken 
would impose on the American criminal justice system. Starting from documented 
cases in which factually innocent persons have been wrongfully convicted, Professor 
Bakken proposes sweeping changes. Most strikingly, he would allow defendants at 
any time before trial to plead “innocent”—that is, to raise the claims that they were 
factually innocent of the charges against them.4 The triggering device for this plea 
would be an affidavit from defense counsel alleging a “good faith” basis for believing 
the defendant to be innocent. Once an innocence plea has been raised, the defendant 
3. Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and Sorting Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt 
or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1009 (2011–12).
4. Bakken, supra note 1, at 566–71.
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would waive his or her constitutional right to remain silent and would have to agree 
to be interviewed by government investigators. Defense counsel would also be 
obligated to turn over any recorded statement by the defendant to the government.5
 Once the defendant has satisfied these obligations, the government would then 
bear additional obligations. At trial, the government would be required to prove guilt 
to a higher level of certainty than proof beyond a reasonable doubt—namely by proof to 
a “moral” or “absolute” certainty. Jurors would also be instructed that they could 
presume innocence from the simple fact of such a plea of innocence. In addition, jurors 
would be told that they could presume that leads presented by the defendant but not 
“adequately” pursued by the government would have been favorable to the defendant. 
By creating the possibility of such an instruction for inadequately explored leads, 
Bakken hopes to “induce the government to conduct a thorough investigation.”6
 B. Keeping the Guilty from Using Protections for the Innocent
 Given all these hoops prosecutors would be forced to jump through to convict a 
defendant pleading innocent, wouldn’t every defendant simply raise that plea? 
Professor Bakken recognizes the clear problem that guilty defendants might be 
tempted to escape justice by imposing additional burdens on prosecutors. Accordingly, 
he would limit the innocence plea to those defendants who can find defense attorneys 
willing to file an affidavit indicating “that upon information, belief, and investigation 
their clients’ claims of innocence are true.”7 As a further safeguard against abusive 
claims, Bakken would require defendants to waive their Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination, be questioned under oath, and produce information about 
the case from the defense files.8 The government would then be entitled to use all 
information that it collects from the defendant.
 Bakken claims that the court rules barring attorneys from filing frivolous or false 
pleadings would mean that guilty defendants could “almost never” avail themselves 
of innocence procedures because their attorneys would not be able to file the 
triggering affidavit.9 Bakken also argues that the waiver of Fifth Amendment 
5. Id. at 549, 569–71.
6. Id. at 572–77. Another distinguished participant in this symposium (Lewis M. Steel) has offered a 
similar idea—the creation of “innocence bureaus” within prosecutors’ offices that would investigate 
claims of innocence in felony cases. Steel suggests the appointment of a bureau chief of impeccable 
reputation, who would then have government resources to assess defendants’ innocence claims. Steel 
would apparently allow the innocence bureau to intervene and block prosecutions if convinced that a 
defendant was innocent. See Lewis M. Steel, Op-Ed., Building a Justice System, News & Observer 
(Raleigh), Jan. 10, 2003, at A17. Similarly, Professor Daniel Medwed has suggested that “screening 
committees” could be created in prosecutors’ offices to review charging decisions. See Daniel S. Medwed, 
Emotionally Charged: The Prosecutorial Charging Decision and the Innocence Revolution, 31 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 2187, 2201 (2010). Because Bakken’s proposal is more sweeping in its effects, I focus my attention 
on his proposal.
7. Bakken, supra note 1, at 568.
8. Id. at 549.
9. Id. at 571.
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protections would be a strong deterrent against false claims of innocence. Bakken 
therefore concludes that the net effect of such screens would be that “only innocent 
persons or the most reckless guilty persons would likely choose to plead innocent.”10
 My instinct is exactly the opposite. Given the overwhelming incentives to raise 
an innocence plea, my sense is that only naive defendants represented by incompetent 
defense counsel would choose not to plead innocent. In support of my intuition, I 
invite the reader to consider the following case, designed to present a typical, 
recurring situation in the American criminal justice system:
An officer in a small town police department in New York pulls Able and 
Baker over for speeding. After they give evasive answers about what they were 
doing, the officer asks for a consent search. Thinking that the officer won’t 
look in the spare tire in the trunk, Able and Baker consent. Unfortunately for 
them, the clever officer discovers five kilos of methamphetamine hidden in 
the tire. Able and Baker both—falsely—deny knowing anything about the 
drugs and claim that somebody must have hidden them in the car. In fact, 
Able and Baker are guilty drug dealers.11
Can these guilty defendants take advantage of Bakken’s proposed innocence 
procedures?
 C.  Defense Attorney Knowledge of Guilt as an Inadequate Barrier to Raising Claims 
of Innocence
 Obviously, my hypothetical example involves no innocent defendant, and so 
Bakken’s procedures would need to deter Able and Baker from taking advantage of 
the new rules. Bakken’s main obstacle to such frivolous claims is supposed to be the 
requirement that defendants’ attorneys have to file a good faith, supporting affidavit 
of possible innocence. Thus, Professor Bakken alleges that “[f]actually guilty 
defendants could almost never avail themselves of innocence procedures because, 
assuming some minimal level of attorney-client communication, their attorneys 
could not affirm a good faith belief in innocence.”12
 Bakken seems to be assuming that guilty criminal defendants will typically tell 
their attorneys the truth, straightforwardly confessing they committed crimes. But 
this assumption does not match the reports of experienced criminal defense attorneys 
about what really happens during client interviews. A good example comes from a 
recent article by Professor Robert Mosteller, who worked in the D.C. Public 
Defender’s Office for seven years before becoming a law professor. In questioning the 
ability of defense attorneys to identify innocent defendants, Mosteller reports:
10. Id. at 566.
11. I served as a federal district court judge for more than five years in the District of Utah, and I frequently 
presided over cases similar to this one. Illegal drug prosecutions, of course, form a major part of both 
the state and federal criminal dockets.
12. Bakken, supra note 1, at 571.
1068
FREEING THE GUILTY WITHOUT PROTECTING THE INNOCENT
[M]y experience with hundreds of clients is that  .  .  . the vast majority 
. . . charged with serious offenses, did not admit guilt. I asked for, and they 
gave me, detailed accounts, some of which turned out to be truthful, some 
untruthful . . . . These factual statements were accompanied by the summary 
contention, explicit or implicit, that “I am innocent.” 
. . . .
. . . I could not tell the innocent from the large percentage that were guilty.13
 Mosteller’s description of the existing system raises serious questions about 
Bakken’s screen. If Mosteller’s experience in the D.C. Public Defender’s Office is 
typical, then many defense attorneys might end up routinely filing affidavits of 
innocence simply based on their client’s protestations. Indeed, defense attorneys will 
be incentivized to do so simply to avoid their clients raising an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim down the road.14 But Mosteller is simply reporting his experience in 
interviewing clients under the current regime without Bakken’s new procedures in 
place. If the procedures were in place, it seems likely that even fewer defense attorneys 
would get information from defendants that would pinpoint them as guilty criminals. 
Defense attorneys would, of course, have a strong disincentive to acquire such 
knowledge: after all, if they know that their clients were guilty, they are precluded 
from obtaining all the favorable provisions of Bakken’s innocence proposal. Therefore, 
the attorneys might move to a different form of initial interview precisely to keep 
from learning the true facts of the crime.
 The literature on defense counsel interviews describes competing approaches. In 
what has been called the “traditional model,” a defense attorney’s client is urged to 
disclose everything about the crime under a pledge of confidentiality.15 It appears 
that this is the kind of interview that Bakken assumes every defense attorney 
undertakes with her client. But a different approach to the interview involves less 
fulsome disclosures. Under the “selective ignorance” model, a defense attorney 
consciously avoids obtaining full knowledge of her client’s involvement in the crime.16 
Instead, she will obtain information only about certain useful facts, while avoiding 
acquiring knowledge about the bedrock issue of the defendant’s guilt. An attorney 
might employ different devices to be selectively ignorant. In one commonly suggested 
approach, a defense attorney might never ask the defendant whether he committed 
13. Robert Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care About Innocence, 50 Santa Clara L. 
Rev. 1, 37, 41 (2010).
14. Defendants who are convicted can later argue that defense counsel was ineffective in investigating an 
avenue of possible exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., Schulz v. Marshall, 528 F. Supp. 2d 77  (E.D.N.Y. 
2007) (holding that for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, in preparing for trial 
counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that renders 
particular investigations unnecessary). Under Bakken’s proposal, convicted defendants presumably could 
argue that their attorneys were ineffective in obtaining the higher burden of proof that would follow 
from an affidavit of possible innocence.
15. See Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics (3d ed. 2004).
16. Id. at 159–60.
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the crime, asking the defendant instead to recount only what the prosecution’s 
witnesses are likely to say.17
 How often do criminal defense attorneys employ the selective ignorance model? 
Good data are hard to come by, but indications suggest this model is a fairly common 
approach. For instance, one study of white collar defense attorneys reported, “Of the 
attorneys I studied, most either said that they sometimes preferred not to get certain 
facts from a client or showed by their actions that they felt this way.”18
 It is not difficult to imagine defense attorneys making even great use of a selective 
ignorance approach in a criminal justice system that has adopted the Bakken 
procedures. A defense attorney might promptly and accurately advise her client of 
innocence procedures and the pre-requisites to their use—specifically including the 
fact that the procedures require the defense attorney to believe that the client is 
innocent. The defense attorney might then conduct the interview so as to be 
selectively ignorant about her client’s guilt, i.e., only asking her client what the 
prosecution is likely to say about his involvement in the crime. Having then solicited 
a minimal amount of information, the defense attorney could then ask her client 
whether he was innocent and, if so, if he would like to take advantage of the innocence 
procedures. Presumably the desired affirmative answer would be forthcoming. The 
defense attorney could also ask her client whether there was anyone who was angry 
with him and who might have been responsible for “setting him up.” No doubt a 
defendant with even a modicum of intelligence could quickly recount several other 
people who were mad at him and who might be the “real” criminals (e.g., ex-girlfriends, 
business rivals, school enemies, and so forth). The interview would then conclude 
and the defense attorney could prepare the requisite innocence affidavit.
 On the hypothetical facts recounted above involving defendant Able, for example, 
the affidavit would presumably look something like the following:
I, Alice Attorney, Esq., do hereby attest to the following:
?? ? ????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
his car. He promptly denied knowing anything about the drugs.
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ? ???????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
also has stated he is innocent and that someone must have planted the 
drugs.
?? ? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
perpetrators to the prosecution.19
17. See, e.g., id. at 193–94 (discussing suggestion by Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. that defense attorneys 
can avoid the rules against knowingly presenting perjured testimony by proceeding in this fashion).
18. Kenneth Mann, Defending White-Collar Crime: A Portrait of Attorneys at Work 104 
(1985).
19. The six leads are discussed infra Part I.D.
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?? ? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
innocent of the charge of drug dealing.
Alice Attorney
 Accordingly, if the Able and Baker example is any guide, then producing the 
“innocence” affidavit would not be difficult. And such an affidavit would trigger the 
full panoply of innocence protections that Bakken proposes—protections that would 
make effective prosecution of the defendant far more difficult. Accordingly, it is 
worth considering whether my Able and Baker hypothetical is some kind of outlier 
or typical of American criminal justice cases.
 There are good reasons for thinking the hypothetical represents a common 
situation and that many (if not in fact most) criminal defendants would be able to get 
an affidavit of this type from their defense attorneys. At the outset, a significant 
percentage of defendants have already given an exculpatory version of the facts to the 
police. Bret Hayman and I published research that recounted what happened when 
criminal suspects were questioned by police in Salt Lake County, Utah, in 1994.20 
Police questioned roughly 79% of all suspects.21 Of those who were questioned, about 
46% had some kind of exculpatory version—23% a denial with explanation, 20% a 
f lat denial, and 3% some other sort of statement.22 Presumably most of the defendants 
who have already denied their involvement in the crime to the police would feel 
comfortable denying their involvement to their defense attorney. If so, then about 
46% of all defendants who are questioned—or 36% of all criminal defendants (both 
those who are questioned and not questioned23)—would be well positioned to file 
innocence claims.24
 Defendants charged with certain kinds of crimes may be particularly likely to argue 
they are innocent. One significant group would be defendants charged with possession 
crimes, such as possession of drugs with intent to distribute25 or possession of a firearm 
by a felon.26 In the Able and Baker hypothetical case, for example, the government will 
20. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of 
Miranda, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 839, 842, 869 (1996).
21. Id. at 854.
22. Id. at 869.
23. Multiplying 79% of suspects questioned by 46% who give an exculpatory version equals 36% of all 
defendants giving an exculpatory version.
24. Such an extrapolation also requires the assumption that the figures from Salt Lake County, Utah, are 
representative of other areas of the United States. There are good reasons for thinking that the Salt 
Lake data is representative. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 20, at 850–51.
25. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006).
26. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
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only have circumstantial evidence linking the defendants to the drugs.27 The chances 
of finding witnesses to contradict a defendant’s claim of innocence are remote. Police 
are often unable to locate those involved in distributing illegal drugs and, even if they 
can identify the distributor, cooperation with authorities is often difficult to arrange. 
Able and Baker thus have little to fear in raising such a claim.
 Similar problems will arise for sexual assault cases involving a consent defense. 
Such cases are already difficult for prosecutors to prove, as the crimes often happen 
in private locations without witnesses. The ambiguities arising out of a “he said, she 
said” fact pattern continue to be a serious problem for effective rape prosecutions.28 If 
Bakken’s proposal were in place, it seems probable that virtually every guilty “date 
rape” defendant would interpose a claim of “innocence,” secure in the knowledge 
that the government would have little with which to challenge him.
 Bakken’s proposal may also extend to misdemeanor prosecutions. If so, the 
proposal would apply to a host of challenging situations where bogus claims of 
innocence would threaten to bog down an already overburdened law enforcement 
apparatus. It is well known that domestic violence convictions are among the most 
difficult for prosecutors to achieve.29 Among the main problems is that battered 
victims often feel unable to continue to provide testimony supporting the prosecution 
throughout the course of a case.30 In addition, as with sexual assault crimes, many 
domestic violence victimizations involve assault in private places, without witnesses 
to provide any objective corroboration of abuse that a victim may have suffered.31 
Here again, it is hard to imagine why a guilty domestic violence defendant would 
want to do anything other than plead innocent.
 Another group of defendants who seem virtually certain to raise innocence claims 
are those planning on presenting an alibi defense. By definition, a defendant who 
contends that he has an alibi for the crime is raising a claim of factual innocence. 
After all, an alibi defense means that the defendant is arguing he was in a different 
27. Of course, the prosecution might attempt to secure additional evidence, by (for example) sending the 
drugs to a crime lab for fingerprint analysis. If the lab found the defendant’s fingerprints, this might 
make an innocence plea problematic. Nothing in Bakken’s proposal, however, requires defendants to 
plead innocence at the outset of a criminal case. Defendants like Able and Baker will thus be able to 
assess the information collected by the prosecution before deciding whether they have a decent shot at 
getting away with a bogus innocence plea. If the fingerprint report came back negative, for example, the 
defendants could presumably plead innocent at that time—even citing the report as additional supporting 
evidence of their innocence.
28. See Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search for Fundamental 
Fairness, 41 Akron L. Rev. 981, 1049 (2008).
29. See Douglas E. Beloof & Joel Shapiro, Let the Truth Be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit 
Domestic Violence Victims’ Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence, 11 Colum. J. Gender & L. 1 
(2002). See generally Douglas E. Beloof, Paul G. Cassell & Steven J. Twist, Victims in Criminal 
Procedure 289–323 (3d ed. 2010).
30. See Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their Victims, 87 Tex. 
L. Rev. 857, 870–71 (2009).
31. See Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1353, 1360–61 (2005).
1072
FREEING THE GUILTY WITHOUT PROTECTING THE INNOCENT
place when the crime was committed.32 Federal and many state rules require that a 
defendant provide, upon request from the prosecution, the specific place where he 
claims to have been when the crime was committed and the names of witnesses who 
will support his alibi.33 But in a situation where even a guilty defendant is already 
turning over to the prosecution a clear outline of his defense, there is little reason not 
to tack on an innocence claim as well.
 Bakken also does not tightly define the types of defenses that are eligible for an 
innocence claim. Like other authors in this field, Bakken seems to have in mind 
situations of “factual” innocence.34 But when Bakken lays out his proposed procedures, 
he does not appear to preclude defendants from raising what might be called claims 
of “legal” innocence by taking advantage of his innocence procedures.35 A claim of 
“factual” innocence is generally understood to involve a “wrong person” argument, 
i.e., an argument that proceeds from the premise that a crime has been committed 
but that someone else committed it.36 A claim of “legal” innocence might include 
justification defenses (i.e., entrapment or self-defense) or excuse defenses (i.e., mental 
state mitigations such as insanity and diminished capacity).
 Bakken does not attempt to limit his proposal to defendants who claim to be 
factually innocent. Even if he had, defining precisely what a claim of “factual” 
innocence is may be difficult. Without a tight definition, many defendants not 
commonly understood as having “innocence” claims would be able to avail themselves 
of Bakken’s new procedures. And even with a tight definition, it is not immediately 
clear how the jury would be instructed in situations where a defendant presents 
inconsistent defenses, one of which might be viewed as involving factual innocence 
and the other as involving legal innocence.
 Defendants will have tremendous incentives to contrive ways to plead innocence 
under Bakken’s proposal. And defense counsel will have tremendous incentives to 
accommodate their clients by filing the necessary triggering affidavit. Bakken seems 
to almost naively assume that the world is composed exclusively of defense attorneys 
whose overriding focus is to determine the guilt or innocence of their clients and 
then proceed accordingly. In reality many defense attorneys will conceptualize their 
role quite differently. Many will view their job as forcing the government to satisfy 
32. Black’s Law Dictionary 84 (9th ed. 2009).
33. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1(b); Colo. R. Crim. P. 16(II)(d); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.200; Haw. R. 
Penal P. 12.1.
34. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review of 
Factual Innocence Claims, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 1281, 1298 (2004) (discussing “brute fact” innocence). But 
cf. Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 1157 (2011) (discussing different ways of 
defining “innocence” and their implications); Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 
1083 (2011) (arguing that a “modified” conception of innocence dilutes the constitutional core that 
protects innocent and guilty alike).
35. See Bakken, supra note 1, at 553–54.
36. See Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction 
from False Confessions, 22 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 523, 535–36 (1999) (discussing “factual innocence” 
definition).
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its burden of proof,37 and others may focus simply on making money. In the real 
world, it is not hard to imagine a few defense attorneys who are particularly aggressive 
in signing affidavits of “actual innocence” in order to gain acquittals for their clients. 
These attorneys would quickly garner the lion’s share of the defense business (at least 
for those who can afford private counsel and therefore have a choice in the matter38), 
further increasing the likelihood that guilty defendants will be able to put forward 
spurious pleas of innocence.
 Bakken brief ly acknowledges the possibility that defense counsel may file 
inadequately supported affidavits of innocence. But he believes that the sanctions 
currently provided in the rules against filing frivolous pleadings—exemplified by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1139—create a sufficient safeguard.40 If anything, 
experience with Rule 11 offers scant comfort, as the Rule does not seem to have been 
particularly effective at deterring frivolous claims.41 Moreover, all that a defense 
attorney would need to establish a good faith basis for an innocence affidavit is her 
client’s statement that he is innocent. No doubt many guilty defendants would be 
happy to provide such an avowal.
 In sum, Bakken’s proposal seems to lack any meaningful safeguards against 
guilty defendants raising claims of innocence. This might not be cause for concern if 
the innocence plea did not impede convicting those who were truly guilty. It is 
therefore worth turning to the obstacles to conviction that would confront prosecutors 
facing such a plea.
 D. The Impracticalities of Requiring Prosecutors to Conduct “Adequate” Investigations
 Sadly, once a guilty defendant interposes an innocence plea, Bakken’s proposals 
would impose so many restrictions on the prosecution that a conviction would become 
virtually impossible. The first obstacle that a prosecutor would face is a requirement of 
enhanced investigation. Bakken proposes that, following an innocence plea, prosecutors 
must then complete a new and “adequate” innocence investigation into leads provided 
by the defense. Failing such an investigation, the jury would be instructed that it may 
37. See, e.g., Mosteller, supra note 13. 
38. Cf. Daniel S. Medwed, Anatomy of a Wrongful Conviction: Theoretical Implications and Practical Solutions, 
51 Vill. L. Rev. 337, 371–72 (2006) (discussing underfunding of public defender’s offices and the 
“creeping cynicism toward . . . innocence” that may aff lict some public defenders).
39. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
40. See Bakken, supra note 1, at 570–71.
41. See, e.g., Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Reinvigorating Rule 11 Through Enhancement 
of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1555, 1573–76 (2001) (discussing how Rule 11’s “safe 
harbor” provision ironically defeats the rule’s goal of deterring frivolous claims); Byron C. Keeling, 
Toward a Balanced Approach to “Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State 
Sanctions Provisions, 21 Pepp. L. Rev. 1067, 1136 (1994) (criticizing Rule 11 and other sanctions schemes 
for deterring “too much licit litigation” while at the same time deterring “too little illicit litigation”).
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presume that leads not explored by the prosecution would have produced evidence 
favorable to the defense.42
 This requirement of “adequate” investigation seems unworkable. Consider, for 
example, the kinds of “leads” that Able and Baker might be able to provide in the 
hypothetical drug case outlined above:
?? ? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
meth ring that lately has been actively dealing methamphetamine.
?? ? ???? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
mad.
?? ? ????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a methamphetamine problem.
?? ? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
been hiding drugs in spare tires.
?? ? ?????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a bar last week; Paul stomped out and vowed to get him.
?? ? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
car shortly before he left on the drive that led to the police discovering the 
drugs.
 All of these allegations appear to be “leads” that, were Bakken’s proposal adopted, 
law enforcement would have to “adequately” investigate. How the police would go 
about investigating, for example, an allegation that “Charlie” or a “white guy” of 
average height is dealing methamphetamine is not immediately clear. In addition, 
when the allegations span multiple jurisdictions—such as the suggestion by Baker 
(arrested in New York) that Frank (in Connecticut) or Paul (in Utah) is responsible—
the complexities only grow. What if the Connecticut or Utah authorities don’t 
“adequately” follow up on the request of the New York police for assistance? How 
would the New York authorities force them to do so?43 Or would the New York police 
be required to fly to Connecticut or Utah to run to ground this spurious suggestion?
 Further fundamental difficulties exist with the very idea of defining an “adequate” 
investigation. Bakken appears to envision a judicially enforceable right to adequate 
investigation,44 which presumably means that the government will be required to 
42. Bakken, supra note 1, at 572–73.
43. Bakken proposes sanctioning the law enforcement agency that fails to adequately investigate the case, but 
he seems to assume that a single agency is involved in all cases. See id. at 573 (referring to “the government” 
as the one conducting the investigation). Of course, in the real world, many cases are investigated not by 
a monolithic government but rather by multiple agencies in multiple jurisdictions. Moreover, as Bakken 
recognizes, the sanction of unfavorable jury instructions falls on prosecutors, not police agencies. Cf. 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting) (noting same problem with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
44. See Bakken, supra note 1, at 573 (discussing jury instructions to be given if court finds government 
investigation inadequate).
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turn over all of its investigative materials to defendants so that they can assess 
whether to file a claim of “inadequacy” with the court. Such disclosures could create 
substantial issues. For example, the police might check with their informants around 
town (including very highly placed informants) to see if they have heard of “Charlie.” 
If the unvarying answer was no, that might well constitute adequate investigation. 
But then the police would presumably be required to turn over this sensitive 
information to defense counsel, who could then file an “adequacy” challenge to it. 
This disclosure of investigative avenues and resources seems particularly likely to 
pose a risk of compromising law enforcement sources and methods with little 
offsetting benefit in return.45
 Even assuming that police made a full investigation of the spurious leads and 
then made full disclosure to defense counsel, it is difficult to understand how courts 
would then litigate the question of “adequacy.” Courts have been reluctant to get into 
the business of second-guessing the allocation of police resources.46 It is easy to 
understand why. Deciding what constitutes an adequate investigation inevitably 
involves assessing trade-offs: a detective working on one case is necessarily not 
working on another. If the local police department decides that its detectives have 
more pressing business to attend to than tracking down an unsubstantiated allegation 
from an accused drug dealer that “Charlie” is really behind planting drugs, how 
would a court determine which task the detective should focus on? The issue of the 
adequacy of a police investigation truly seems to be one lacking in “ judicially 
manageable standards,”47 which perhaps explains why Bakken does not even attempt 
to lay out evaluative criteria. At the very least, even assuming that the courts could 
ultimately develop standards for evaluating such claims, Bakken’s proposal seems 
sure to allow guilty defendants to generate substantial satellite litigation over the 
adequacy of police investigations, diverting both police and judicial resources into 
many wild-goose chases.
 Defendants will have substantial incentives to raise questions about the adequacy 
of these investigations because the price prosecutors would have to pay for an adverse 
finding would be a high one. Bakken would instruct the jury that “the absence of a 
government investigation to recover evidence reasonably available to the government 
indicates that the evidence does, indeed, indicate innocence, even in the absence of 
the introduction of the evidence at trial.”48 To continue with the illustration offered 
above, if the court determined that police efforts to find “Charlie” were insufficient, 
the jury would then be instructed that evidence about Charlie would have indicated 
45. See Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380 (2d Cir. 1973) (suggesting “serious 
questions of potential abuse” if accused persons can obtain access to government files by raising mere 
general allegations of inadequate prosecution efforts).
46. See, e.g., Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to be 
protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen.”); cf. Estate of Macias v. Ihde, 
219 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000) (adding that “there is a constitutional right, however, to have police 
services administered” without racial bias).
47. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
48. Bakken, supra note 1, at 573.
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that he was the real perpetrator—even if the defendant fails to introduce any evidence 
at trial about Charlie. Bakken states with satisfaction that such an instruction “would 
increase the likelihood of acquittal significantly”49—with the idea of a truly innocent 
defendant in mind. But given the ease with which guilty defendants can take 
advantage of his proposal, raising the prospects of acquittal significantly in such 
cases is cause for alarm.
 E. The Impossible Standard of Proving Guilt to an “Absolute Certainty”
 Bakken would extend to the defendant even more protections than just the 
opportunity to litigate the adequacy of the government’s investigation. Merely by 
virtue of a defendant’s plea of innocence, Bakken would dramatically raise the 
ultimate burden of proof that a prosecutor would have to satisfy—from proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt to proof “to a moral certainty” or “to an absolute certainty.”50 Here 
again, Bakken has in mind the plight of an innocent defendant wrongly ensnared in 
the criminal justice system. For any guilty defendant, however, requiring proof to an 
absolute certainty would seem to effectively bar any prosecution.51
 To see how this change would be reflected in real world jury instructions, consider 
the standard New York instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt:
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The law recognizes that, in dealing with human affairs, there are very few 
things in this world that we know with absolute certainty . . . . A reasonable 
doubt is an honest doubt of the defendant’s guilt for which a reason exists 
based upon the nature and quality of the evidence. It is an actual doubt, not 
an imaginary doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable person, acting in a matter 
of this importance, would be likely to entertain because of the evidence that 
was presented or because of the lack of convincing evidence.52
 If the instruction is changed to ref lect Bakken’s proposed higher standard of 
proof to an absolute certainty, it would need to read something like this:
49. Id.
50. Id. at 574–75.
51. It is not clear what proof to a moral certainty means, and Bakken makes no attempt to define it precisely. 
Cf. Barbara J. Shapiro, ‘To a Moral Certainty’: Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries 1600-1850, 
38 Hastings L.J. 153 (1986). Indeed, at odds with Bakken’s intentions, it is possible that proof to a moral 
certainty might actually amount to a lower standard of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
U.S. Supreme Court discussed the phrase at length in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994). The Court 
noted that “moral certainty” was apparently first used in Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 
(1850), where it was essentially a synonym for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Over time, however, the 
Court observed that the phrase has come to mean a mere probabilistic assessment of guilt. Victor, 511 U.S. 
at 14. The Court ultimately concluded that use of the phrase standing alone might now conflict with due 
process requirements. Id. at 16–17. Because of the uncertainties of what proof to a “moral certainty” might 
actually mean, I focus on Bakken’s alternative proposal of proof to an “absolute certainty.”
52. N.Y. Crim. Jury Instructions, Reasonable Doubt (2d ed. 2001), http://www.nycourts.gov/cji/1-
General/CJI2d.Presumption.Burden.Reasonable_Doubt.pdf.
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Proof to an Absolute Certainty
The law recognizes that, in dealing with human affairs, there are very few 
things in this world that we know with absolute certainty. Proof to an absolute 
certainty requires that you be absolutely—that is completely—certain of the 
defendant’s guilt based on your own inner feelings that the defendant is 
without a doubt guilty. Any doubt you may have requires you to acquit the 
defendant. The doubt need not be a reasonable one based on the nature or 
quality of the evidence.
 It is hard to understand how a jury could ever end up rendering a guilty verdict if 
advised that “any” doubt is sufficient to acquit, and that this doubt need not even be 
a reasonable one based on the evidence. Such an instruction really seems tantamount 
to an instruction for a directed verdict, i.e., a verdict of not guilty.53 As one 
commentator has noted in trying to raise the standard of proof for death penalty 
cases above the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard: “If true absolute certainty were 
required in death penalty cases, then it would appear that no defendant would ever 
be sentenced to death, for no juror would ever be able to truly say she had ‘absolute 
certainty.’”54
 A not guilty verdict is desirable, of course, when innocent defendants are on trial. 
But this only reinforces the compelling need to make certain that only truly innocent 
defendants can take advantage of Bakken’s proposal. Such safeguards against abuse 
are lacking.
 But Bakken is not finished with imposing burdens on prosecutors. As one last 
protective measure, Bakken would allow the jury to infer from the defendant’s plea 
of innocence alone that the defendant is in fact innocent.55 This instruction promises 
to be particularly pernicious, both for the incentives it would create and the 
consequences it would spawn. Because this jury instruction would allow juries to 
return a not guilty verdict based solely on the plea of innocence alone, guilty 
defendants will press mightily to have their attorneys raise a claim of innocence for 
them. Once a defense attorney raises such a claim—and obtains the instruction 
allowing juries to infer innocence from that claim alone—the trial would essentially 
turn into a crapshoot. Nothing the prosecution could say in response would really 
rebut the inference, as the jury is told that they can infer innocence from the fact of 
the innocence plea “alone.”
53. See generally Barbara J. Shapiro, “Beyond Reasonable Doubt” and “Probable Cause”: Historical 
Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence 41 (1991) (recounting historical 
development of the idea of proof beyond a reasonable doubt because of the impossibility of absolute 
proof in the empirical realm of events). Cf. Ronald J. Allen, Standards of Proof and the Limits of Legal 
Analysis, (Nw. Univ. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 11-47, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1830344## (questioning the extent to which articulation of standards of 
proof rules make a real world difference).
54. Erik Lillquist, Absolute Certainty and the Death Penalty, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 45, 74 (2005).
55. Bakken, supra note 1, at 575.
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 F.  The Trade-offs Inhering in Protecting the Innocent by Burdening Prosecution of the 
Guilty
 For all these reasons, significant problems lurk in Bakken’s proposals. They 
would protect innocent defendants, but at the significant cost of blocking conviction 
of many guilty defendants. It is worth trying to generally assess some of these trade-
offs. Even a quick look at some of the numbers involved suggests that the American 
prosecuting and police agencies (already generally regarded as underfunded) could 
well collapse under the weight of new burdens that Bakken would assign to them.
 As I have tried to articulate, it appears likely that a significant number of guilty 
defendants would try—and succeed—in raising pleas of innocence if Bakken’s 
proposal were the law of this country. Precisely how many would be able to do so is a 
matter of conjecture, but it seems likely that the hundreds of thousands of innocence 
pleas would have to be processed by the system. One ballpark figure can be derived 
by assuming that defendants who have already given an exculpatory version of events 
to the police will happily persist in that position through the early stages of a criminal 
case.56 As noted earlier, it is reasonable to estimate that roughly 36% of all criminal 
defendants in this country deny to the police their involvement in the crime or give 
some exculpatory version of the facts.57 If even half of these defendants persist in a 
plea of innocence, more than 700,000 innocence pleas would be raised annually in 
the courts for violent, property, and drug offenses alone.58 For these hundreds of 
thousands of innocence pleas, the government would then be required to conduct a 
new and “adequate” investigation—the adequacy of which prosecutors would then 
presumably have to frequently litigate in court. Such a massive burden on the system 
would be a recipe for disaster.
 Bakken might respond by pointing to the clear and obvious importance of preventing 
the conviction of innocent persons. He could point out—and I would agree—that it is 
more important to prevent the wrongful conviction of an innocent person than to allow 
56. One odd feature of Bakken’s proposal is that it does not seem to bar defendants who press pleas of 
innocence in the early stages of a case from later pleading guilty to reduced charges on the eve of trial. 
To the contrary, Bakken specifically envisions defendants using an innocence plea to force prosecutors 
to “offer an acceptable plea agreement,” Bakken, supra note 1, at 572, and notes that an innocent 
defendant might choose to plead guilty. Id. at 572 n.8 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 
(1970)). But given the grave risk of abuses that inhere in Bakken’s proposal, it seems more sensible to 
f latly block a defendant who presents a sworn innocence affidavit to the Court from thereafter 
negotiating a plea to any reduced charges. Given the realities of modern-day plea bargaining, such a 
restriction might begin to create a real disincentive to submit frivolous innocence pleas—something 
which Bakken’s proposal lacks.
57. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text.
58. See 2009 Uniform Crime Reports: Estimated Number of Arrests by Offense, Fed. Bureau of Investigation 
(Sept. 2010), http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_29.html. The figure recounted in the text is 
obtained by adding together the number of arrests for violent crimes, property crimes, and drug abuse 
violations and then multiplying the sum by 18%. If one simply uses the number of arrests for all crimes, 
the figure in the text would be about four times larger.
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a guilty criminal to escape.59 But the trade-offs here are not unlimited.60 Surely Bakken 
would agree that the goal of preventing the conviction of the innocent should not be 
pursued to the point where vast numbers of guilty criminals are set free.
 How well the criminal justice system is functioning today may shed light on the 
nature of the trade-offs involved. It is well known that the criminal justice system 
today does not send every criminal to prison—not even every violent or murderous 
criminal. Instead, because of what criminologists refer to as the “criminal justice 
funnel,” only a small percentage of crimes ever lead to even a clearly guilty criminal 
going to prison. A rough approximation of the national criminal justice funnel is 
found in the chart below. As can be seen using data from a recent year for violent 
crimes, the American criminal justice system goes from more than six million violent 
crimes committed to approximately 113,000 prison sentences a year.61 The vast 
majority of these defendants has pled guilty and are, by any measure, guilty of the 
crimes that have sent them to prison.62
59. For a good explication of the reasons underlying this conclusion, see D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: 
An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. Crim L. & Criminology 761 (2007).
60. For a humorous review of the trade-offs, see Alexander Volokh, Aside, n Guilty Men, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
173 (1997) (recounting differing ratios that have historically been offered).
61. The methodology underlying the chart is contained in the Appendix to this article.
62. The highest empirically based figure of innocents convicted appears to be a rate of 3.3% to 5% for a 
subset of capital homicide trials, reported in Risinger, supra note 59, at 763. This implies at least a 95% 
guilt rate. Moreover, it should be noted that this error rate involves defendants convicted at trial. Since 
roughly 98% of defendants plead guilty, Risinger’s figure (assuming it is correct) would not apply to 
most criminal justice convictions. Other figures are far lower. See Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent 
from False Confessions and Lost Confessions—and from Miranda, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 497, 
507–24 (1998). See generally Alan M. Dershowitz, The Best Defense xxi (1982) (proposing “Rule I” 
of the “ justice game” as “[a]lmost all criminal defendants are, in fact, guilty”).
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 My project here is not to discourage efforts to protect the innocent from wrongful 
conviction. Instead, my point is to suggest that the goal of innocence protection must 
proceed against a backdrop of a few needles—innocents wrongfully convicted—in a 
comparatively big hay stack—the vast pool of guilty defendants.63 Reform proposals 
designed without an awareness of these trade-offs can end up presenting far more 
problems than they would solve. Bakken’s proposals suffer from the f law of protecting 
the innocent at the great cost of making it difficult (or impossible) to convict countless 
guilty criminals.
II. PROTECTING THE INNOCENT WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY CONVICTING THE GUILTY
 Although Bakken’s proposals appear to be a cure worse than the disease, that is 
not to say that we should make no effort to address the problem of innocents who 
might be wrongfully convicted in the criminal justice system. Ideally reform proposals 
would avoid such trade-offs, i.e., they would help protect the innocent from wrongful 
conviction without making it more difficult to convict the guilty. It has been 
suggested elsewhere that we can enact reforms that both offer greater protection for 
the innocent without freeing the guilty.64 It is in that spirit that I offer the following 
proposals. Of course, as a practical matter, enacting reforms that do not compromise 
public safety will be considerably easier than those that do. Therefore, the proposals 
below would appear to stand a far greater chance of actually being implemented than 
do proposals like Bakken’s.
 At the same time, these proposals proceed from the perspective of “innocentrism,” 
a useful term coined by my colleague Daniel Medwed. Innocentrism privileges the 
exoneration of the factually innocent as a criminal justice value over other competing 
values.65 In this article, I present these ideas as a basis for starting discussion, rather 
than as fully formulated policy proposals. But I believe merit exists in considering 
the following ideas.
 A. More Research on the Frequency and Causes of Wrongful Convictions
 At the top of my list of measures to address the problem of wrongful convictions of 
the innocent is further research on the extent and causes of the problem. In particular, 
we need further research on the frequency in which defendants are wrongfully 
63. Cf. Medwed, supra note 6, at 2210 (noting the difficulty in attempting to review every prosecutorial 
charging decision because “[m]any routine cases in our burgeoning, unrelenting criminal justice system 
may not merit extensive outside evaluation”).
64. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges 
Crime Control and Due Process, 41 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 133, 134 (2008) (arguing that the goals of convicting 
the guilty and protecting the innocent are not mutually exclusive).
65. Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1549. See generally Daniel S. Medwed, 
Prosecution Complex: America’s Race to Convict and Its Impact on the Innocent 
(forthcoming Mar. 2012).
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convicted and the most important causes of these wrongful convictions.66 To be sure, 
there has been considerable research about the wrongful convictions in the past, 
including some collections of wrongful conviction cases. But even disregarding the 
questions about how “innocence” is determined in some of this research,67 a more 
fundamental problem is the fact that a collection of alleged miscarriages may not be 
representative of the processing of cases in the American criminal justice system.68
 One way of addressing the issue of the error rate is to survey knowledgeable 
persons in the criminal justice system. In 1995, Professors Huff, Rattner, and Sagarin 
concluded that the error rate in Ohio was 0.5% based on such a survey.69 But this 
estimate was badly f lawed. The estimate was based on a survey in which most 
respondents checked a box indicating that the number of wrongful convictions in the 
United States was “less than one percent.” From these responses, Huff and his 
colleagues argued that “most responses [were] hovering near the 1% mark.”70 They 
then simply chose the “midpoint” between 0% and 1% and used it to estimate the 
number of wrongful convictions.
 But it is hard to understand how the answers were “hovering” near any particular 
point. The respondents received a survey instrument with the categories of “never,” 
“less than 1%,” “1–5%,” etc.71 There was no “hovering” to do. Of course, the range 
covered by the response “less than 1%” extends as low as 0.0001% (or one in a million) 
and even lower. There is little reason for supposing that the respondents were 
estimating the value to be 0.5% rather than, say, 0.0001%.72 Surprisingly, despite the 
obvious f laws in this study, it continues to be cited today, even by participants in this 
66. Others have proposed creating a commission to study cases of proven wrongful convictions. See, e.g., 
Keith A. Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study Wrong ful 
Convictions, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 333 (2002). My proposal is slightly different because I propose to 
conduct research to expand our knowledge about a random sample of wrongful convictions, rather than 
simply study the nonrandom sample of wrongful convictions that have already come to light.
67. Compare Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 
Stan. L. Rev. 21, 72–75 (1987) (presenting cases of alleged execution of the innocent), with Stephen J. 
Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 Stan. L. 
Rev. 121 (1988) (questioning the accuracy of the determinations of “innocence”); compare also Richard 
A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages 
of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 429 (1998) (presenting 
cases of alleged wrongful convictions from false confessions), with Cassell, supra note 36 (also questioning 
the accuracy of the determinations of “innocence”).
68. For an interesting discussion of these (and other) problems, see Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, 
Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. 
Empirical Legal Stud. 927 (2008).
69. C. Ronald Huff et al., Convicted But Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy 
57–62 (1996).
70. Id. at 61.
71. Arye Rattner, Convicting the Innocent: When Justice Goes Wrong 204 (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Ohio State University).
72. See Cassell, supra note 62, at 517.
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symposium.73 Even if the survey instrument were not f lawed, it is not obvious how 
participants in the system would have a good basis for estimating the frequency of 
such low probability events.
 Rather than a survey approach, an empirically-based estimate of miscarriages is 
needed—specifically a random sample of cases that could be reviewed for miscarriages 
within it.74 Along these lines, recent research by Professor D. Michael Risinger is 
worth mentioning.75 Rather than despair at the impossibility of the task of conducting 
such research, Risinger made efforts to find data that would permit an empirical 
assessment. He combined data on capital exonerations in rape-murder cases from the 
Innocence Project with an estimate of the relevant number of similar cases that were 
processed in the system at the same time. He produced an error rate of somewhere 
between 3.3% to 5%—much higher than previously produced estimates.
 Risinger is to be commended for the zeal with which he has pursued a fundamental 
issue in the innocence field. But even accepting his error rate as correct within the 
sample of cases he relied upon, reason exists for doubting whether Risinger’s error 
rate generally reflects routine processing of cases in the American criminal justice 
system. For example, in my own research in Salt Lake County, I did not detect even 
a single wrongful conviction in a sample of 173 filed criminal cases.76 Under Risinger’s 
error rate, my sample should have included between five and nine innocent-yet-
wrongfully convicted defendants. This suggests that Risinger’s sample may not have 
been a “random audit” of American criminal case processing77 but rather a reflection 
of something unique about the particular capital cases he was reviewing.78
 What I propose is that researchers take a random sample of a large number of 
filed felony criminal cases (1000 seems like a good number) and then track those 
cases through the system to see what happens. While it might not be possible to 
follow all 1000 cases carefully, it would seem likely that the cases where a defendant 
might plausibly be innocent would shrink the numbers down fairly rapidly. 
Researchers could focus on those cases and try to come up with an initial, plausible 
73. See Leon Friedman, The Problem of Convicting Innocent Persons: How Often Does It Occur and How Can It 
Be Prevented, 56. N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1053, 1056 (2011–12). 
74. I pursue this subject at greater length. See Cassell, supra note 62, at 507–13.
75. See Risinger, supra note 59.
76. See Cassell, supra note 62, at 509. To be clear, I previously reviewed my sample for indications of a 
wrongful conviction from false confessions. But in the course of that review, I did not see any indication 
of a wrongful conviction for any reason. Nor am I aware that any such claim has been made about these 
cases in subsequent years. I readily admit that my methodology is not perfect, and thus propose 
additional research in this area.
77. Risinger, supra note 59, at 785 (citing Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 61, 69–70 
(2003)).
78. Cf. Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions are Common in Capital Cases, 44 
Buff. L. Rev. 469 (1996) (arguing that certain capital cases pose a unique risk of convicting the 
innocent); Friedman, supra note 73, at 1057 (arguing that “[t]he more serious the crime, the more 
pressure there is to solve it”). But cf. Ehud Guttel & Doron Teichman, Criminal Sanctions in the Defense 
of the Innocent, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 597 (2012) (arguing that the higher the penalty, the higher the 
standard of proof factfinders will apply).
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number of cases in which a wrongful conviction was even a possibility, and then 
perhaps press even further to try and get to the bedrock truth in this subset of cases.79 
Research of this type might be very valuable for revealing both the scope of any 
wrongful conviction problem and particular areas where wrongful convictions might 
be prevalent. This would permit a targeted response to wrongful convictions issues,80 
rather than a blunderbuss approach exemplified by Bakken’s proposal.
 B.  Allowing Waiver of Rights in Exchange for Greater Freedom to Raise Post-
Conviction Innocence Claims
 In this symposium, Professor Samuel Gross presents an intriguing idea for using 
pretrial procedures to sort between guilty and innocent defendants.81 He notes that 
currently defendants are given only two choices: plead guilty or go to trial. He 
proposes placing a third option on the table, specifically an option for an “investigative 
trial.” In such a trial, the defendant would be able to argue his innocence provided he 
waived important rights, including the right against self-incrimination, the right to 
exclude illegally seized evidence, and the right to a jury trial. In exchange, a defendant 
(if convicted) would be given greater freedom to raise post-convictions claims of 
innocence.82
 Gross’s intriguing proposal builds on the insight that we need to try and offer a 
set of options that create different incentives for guilty and innocent defendants. 
Unlike the Bakken proposal, however, which seems to single-mindedly focus on 
defendants who are innocent, Gross recognizes that most defendants in the system 
are in fact guilty. Any sorting scheme must accordingly create the right incentives for 
both groups.
 Gross’s tentative proposal gets the big picture right, by aligning incentives the 
right way. But for the incentives to work properly, the devil may be in the details. He 
is maddeningly vague on the most critical incentive: what kind of sentence should a 
defendant receive if he is found guilty after an investigative trial. As Gross 
acknowledges, for his scheme to succeed, a defendant convicted after electing the 
investigative trial option must receive a longer sentence than those who elect a guilty 
plea—otherwise every defendant would simply opt for the investigative trial.83 But 
79. In some previous studies, when researchers eager to find wrongfully convicted defendants have made 
the judgments about “innocence,” many of their ultimate conclusions have been erroneous. See Cassell, 
supra note 36, at 535–37. Accordingly, it would be ideal if multiple researchers with diverse perspectives 
on wrongful convictions were involved in making the final judgments about innocence, including (for 
example) former prosecutors and others who may be skeptical of “innocence” claims.
80. For example, I have previously proposed that we should pay particular attention to issues involving 
alleged false confessions by the mentally retarded, rather than overgeneralizing the problem and 
proceeding on the assumption that false confessions are a routine product of police interrogation of 
those with normal mental faculties. See id. at 580–87.
81. See Gross, supra note 3.
82. See id. at 1023.
83. See id. at 1023–25.
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the sentence can’t be so much longer that any incentive to use the investigative trial 
disappears. The trick, of course, is to find the happy median.
 Let me offer two tentative suggestions for how the Gross proposal might be 
implemented. The first is that the proposal could be tested in a small set of cases to 
see how it operates, with possible modifications and expansions later on. One possible 
subset of cases might be homicide cases, where there is some suggestion that wrongful 
convictions may be a particular problem.84
 The second is that implementation of the proposal might be simplest in a 
jurisdiction where sentencing guidelines already in place give defendants a specific 
incentive to plead guilty. Without such guidelines, putting Gross’s proposal in place 
might require judges to come perilously close to simply stating that they are imposing 
a “trial tax” on defendants who exercise their rights,85 with the tax reduced for those 
who insist on a less burdensome trial compared to a full-f ledged jury trial. On the 
other hand, in jurisdictions with sentencing guidelines, it should be possible to craft 
an arrangement with some precision that avoids these difficulties. For instance, in 
the federal system, a defendant involved in serious crimes receives a three-level 
reduction from the otherwise applicable sentencing guidelines for “acceptance of 
responsibility,” which is based in part on the fact that the defendant’s prompt notice 
of an intent to plead guilty “permit[s] the government and the court to allocate their 
resources effectively.”86 It might be possible to add a separate guideline that would 
allow for a reduction of, say, one level for a defendant who opted for an investigative 
trial. The guideline might award the reduction only if the defendant had taken steps 
to make the trial as efficient as possible, such as by stipulating to uncontested facts 
and otherwise focusing the trial on guilt/innocence issues.87
 Gross’s thoughtful proposal deserves serious consideration. If carefully 
constructed, it might provide the long-sought, yet elusive, mechanism for sorting 
between guilty and (plausibly) innocent suspects, thereby allowing the system to 
focus resources on precisely those cases where concern about miscarriages should be 
greatest.
 C. Implementing Existing Rules on Disclosing Exculpatory Evidence
 It is well-settled law that prosecutors must disclose to criminal defendants 
exculpatory evidence—so-called “Brady material.”88 Yet in a few cases, it is clear that 
prosecutors have failed to discharge that obligation and, in some smaller subset of 
these cases, persons have been wrongfully convicted as a result. How often such 
84. See Gross, supra note 78.
85. See Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 14 (2010) (discussing 
the concept of “trial tax”).
86. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 (2010).
87. Cf. Daniel S. Medwed, California Dreaming? The Golden State’s Restless Approach to Newly Discovered 
Evidence of Innocence, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1437, 1476 (2007) (noting that one of the glaring difficulties 
in current innocence procedures is their undue complexity).
88. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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problems occur is uncertain. In this symposium, it has been asserted that “we know 
that the nondisclosure of exculpatory information is a major cause of wrongful 
convictions.”89 Other research seems to suggest that withholding exculpatory 
evidence is a comparatively minor cause of wrongful convictions.90
 Regardless of the frequency with which a failure to produce Brady material causes 
miscarriages, it still makes sense to do what can reasonably be done to correct any 
problems. How to ensure timely production of Brady material has been the subject of 
recent, active investigation, both by academics91 and the U.S. Department of Justice.92 
Rather than assess all of the various proposals that have been made, I simply add one 
note about where efforts can most profitably be directed.
 I have personal experience with a case involving (inadvertently) withheld Brady 
material. When I was a federal district court judge, I ordered a new trial where I had 
questions about the guilt of the defendant. During retrial, significant exculpatory 
evidence emerged, which the prosecution had (inadvertently) failed to produce during 
the earlier trial. When that material surfaced, the prosecution immediately dropped 
the case.93
 The problem that arose in my case stemmed from various local police agencies 
who handled different parts of the investigation, which the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
then prosecuted. The varying agencies simply lacked an effective way to pool all the 
evidence that they had gathered—the classic difficulty of the government’s left hand 
not being aware of what its right hand is doing. Other scholars have raised this 
89. Lissa Griffin, Pretrial Procedures for Innocent People: Reforming Brady, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 969, 971 
(2011–12). The source for this assertion is apparently Jim Dwyer, Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, 
Actual Innocence 225 (1st ed. 2001), which reported that 64% of the first seventy-four DNA-based 
exonerations involved suppression of exculpatory evidence.
90. See, e.g., Huff et al., supra note 69, at 64 tbl.3.3 (listing causes of wrongful convictions; suppression of 
exculpatory evidence is not on the list); Bedau & Radelet, supra note 67, at 56 tbl.6 (among 534 cases 
counted as having an error, thirty-five (6.5%) were attributable to “suppression of exculpatory evidence”). 
But cf. Markman & Cassell, supra note 67 (criticizing the study’s methodology).
91. Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on 
Best Practices, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 1961 (2010); Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the 
Prosecutor’s Office, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 2089 (2010); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1533 (2010).
92. In January 2010, the Justice Department issued additional guidelines to prosecutors for the purpose of 
reducing the chance of error during criminal discovery. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00165.pdf. In 
2006, the Justice Department amended the U.S. Attorney’s Manual provisions on disclosures by 
requiring prosecutors to take a broad view of disclosure requirements. See Memorandum from David W. 
Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Issuance of Guidance and Summary of Actions Taken 
in Response to the Report of the Department of Justice Criminal Discovery and Case Management 
Working Group (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo.pdf. The provision 
was last updated in June 2010. See U.S. Attorney’s Manual 9-5.001(c) (2010). 
93. The defendant in that case later sued the prosecutors, unsuccessfully, for violating his civil rights by 
failing to produce the materials. See Oetinger v. Embley, No. 1:08-CV-165-CW, 2010 WL 4973324 (D. 
Utah Nov. 10, 2010); cf. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (finding no § 1983 cause of 
action for Brady violation).
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concern,94 with the suggestion that new information-sharing technologies could 
solve the problem.95 Such solutions should be aggressively pursued because they 
promise a win-win approach that gets defendants the information to which they are 
entitled—without interfering with crime control efforts by imposing undue burdens 
on police or prosecuting agencies.
 Similarly worth considering is the idea of moving the culture of “trial by ambush” 
toward one of full disclosure—by both the prosecution and the defense. Professors 
D. Michael Risinger and Lesley C. Risinger make such a proposal in this 
symposium,96 noting that innocent defendants would much prefer a system of 
reciprocal discovery to the current regime. The Risingers also report that “reciprocal 
waivers are the key to making such discovery schemes work in those jurisdictions, 
such as New Jersey, that have successfully adopted so-called ‘open file’ discovery 
practices.”97 Here again is another opportunity for adopting a reform that will assist 
innocent defendants in the system without any compromising the ability of the 
prosecution to convict the guilty.
 D.  Increasing Resources for Indigent Defense Counsel and Prosecutors to Focus on 
Issues Relating to Actual Innocence
 The proposals discussed so far might be viewed by some as nibbling around the 
edges of the problem. But the root cause of wrongful convictions is probably lack of 
resources devoted to the criminal justice system. Whatever individual causes might 
be pinpointed in particular cases, more resources would often have enabled defense 
counsel (or police and prosecuting agencies) to locate persuasive evidence of innocence. 
If this diagnosis is correct, then the true solution to the wrongful conviction problem 
is devoting additional resources to the criminal justice system.
 Given the fiscal realities of the world we live in, however, it would truly be an 
academic proposal to call for significant new funding for defense attorneys, for 
example.98 At a macro level, the funds devoted to the criminal justice system are 
probably roughly fixed and not much is likely to change in the near term.99 What is 
needed, then, is to prioritize innocence over other criminal justice expenditures. 
Fortunately, for those who truly believe innocentrism, there are ways to do this.
94. See, e.g., New Perspectives on Brady, supra note 91, at 1980.
95. Id.
96. D. Michael Risinger & Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence is Different: Taking Innocence into Account in 
Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 869, 886–90 (2011–12).
97. Id. at 887.
98. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 
Hastings L.J. 1031, 1059 (2006).
99. See Erik Lillquist, Improving Accuracy in Criminal Cases, 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 897 (2007) (noting a 
common assumption that there are fixed resources devoted to criminal justice).
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 E.  Abolishing the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, and Consequently Shifting 
Defense Resources Away from Litigating Purely Procedural Claims
 If we want the criminal justice system to prioritize the issue of innocence and 
devote more resources to it, then a good start would be to consider abolishing the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Abolition of the rule and replacing it with a 
system of civil damage remedies has been advocated by such distinguished legal 
figures as Chief Justice Warren Burger,100 Dallin Oaks,101 Akhil Amar,102 Bill 
Pizzi,103 and symposium participant Paul Robinson.104 The classic argument for 
abolishing the exclusionary rule is that the rule sets criminals free because the 
constable has blundered.105 But there is a more subtle, and in many ways more 
pernicious, defect to the exclusionary rule. Under a regime that allows the “deliberate 
exclusion of truth from the fact-finding process,”106 defense efforts will move toward 
issues involving the validity of evidence collection rather than toward assessing the 
quality of the evidence itself. Professor William Stuntz perhaps most fam ously made 
this point in his writings, explaining how a system with limited resources that 
emphasizes procedure over substance will give short shrift to factual claims of 
innocence.107 Stuntz is cautious in his argument. As he explains, the current system 
does not simply involve a direct trade-off, but rather “places substantial pressure on 
[defense] counsel to opt for the procedural claim rather than the (potential) 
substantive one.”108 But Stuntz’s bottom-line conclusion seems unassailable: there is 
some trade-off in the current regime favoring procedural claims over substantive 
ones.109
100. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500–01 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
101. See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 739–
40 (1970).
102. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure 40–45 (1997).
103. See William T. Pizzi, Trials Without Truth: Why Our System of Criminal Trials Has 
Become an Expensive Failure and What We Need to Do to Rebuild It (1999).
104. Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Law Without Justice: Why Criminal Law Doesn’t 
Give People What They Deserve (2006).
105. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926). 
106. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
107. William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 
1, 37–40 (1997).
108. Id. at 40.
109. Professor Mosteller responded to Stuntz’s argument by reporting his own experience that motions to 
suppress “posed only a minimal drain on defense resources.” Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: 
Part of the Solution for Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 Mo. L. 
Rev. 931, 955–56 (2010). But Mosteller concedes that his experience comes from a system in which 
motions to suppress were set on the eve of trial, thereby preventing most such motions from being 
litigated. Id. at 956. Such a system seems atypical to me. For example, in both the state and federal 
systems in Utah, motions to suppress are typically litigated well in advance of trial and thus often 
produce contested suppression hearings.
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 Given this trade-off, those with an innocentric view of the world should be the 
first to jump on the replace-the-exclusionary-rule-with-civil-damages bandwagon. 
Surely the experience of the rest of the world suggests that the exclusionary rule is 
not the only way to restrain police abuses.110 There is good reason to think that we 
can craft a damages regime for protecting Fourth Amendment rights that will fully 
preserve them, just as we rely on a damages regime to protect other civil liberties, 
such as our First Amendment rights.111
 Once procedural issues regarding the legality of searches are diverted to the civil 
justice system, the criminal justice system would gain substantial new resources to 
devote to innocence issues. While the percentage of cases in which the exclusionary 
rule results in guilty criminals going free is disputed,112 it does not appear to be 
disputed that the exclusionary rule results in “tens of thousands of contested 
suppression motions each year.”113 Instead of filing and litigating these motions that 
have nothing to do with innocence, defense counsel could turn their attention to 
substantive issues about who committed the crime. Prioritizing substantive issues of 
guilt and innocence over procedural issues of the reasonableness of searches is exactly 
the way the system should be structured.
 F. Replacing the Miranda Regime with the Videotaping of Custodial Interrogations
 The problem of procedure over substance is not confined solely to Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. The same f law has developed in confession law. Here 
again, those who are most concerned about innocence should be skeptical of the law’s 
current structure, which relies largely on Miranda warnings and waivers to protect 
against coercive interrogations. As a practical matter, this approach does little to the 
help the innocent and prioritizes litigation about Miranda compliance over litigation 
about the accuracy of confessions. The result has been a regime that is not particularly 
well suited to address “false confession” issues114—i.e., not well suited to protecting 
the innocent.
 The problem starts with the fact the innocent defendants are most likely to waive 
their Miranda protections. Innocent persons have nothing to hide from the police, 
110. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that when adopted, the 
exclusionary rule was “unique to American jurisprudence” and that “a categorical exclusionary rule has 
been ‘universally rejected’ by other countries”).
111. See Amar, supra note 102, at 27–29 (explaining why the exclusionary rule is a bad way to deter police 
misconduct compared to a civil damages regime); cf. Yale Kamisar, Mapp v. Ohio 50 Years Later, Nat’l 
L.J., June 13, 2011, at 50 (arguing that critics of the exclusionary rule may not really want an effective 
alternative remedy because it would be just as burdensome on law enforcement).
112. Compare United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (arguing that the small percentage researchers 
deal with masks the large number of felons released from prison based in part on illegal searches and 
seizures), with id. at 950 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that only a very small percentage of all felony 
arrests are declined for prosecution on grounds of potential exclusionary rule problems).
113. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010) (quoting William Stuntz, The Virtues and 
Vices of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 443, 444 (1997)).
114. See generally Cassell, supra note 62.
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and so they almost invariably waive their Miranda rights.115 Once they waive their 
rights, the Miranda procedures do little (if anything) to restrain police questioning 
techniques, a point that seems to be generally accepted.116
 Miranda’s procedural requirements, like those of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule, also shift defense attorney time and attention away from claims of 
innocence. The Miranda procedures have spawned considerable litigation about 
whether a suspect was in “custody,” whether a suspect “waived” his rights, or whether a 
suspect “invoked” his right to counsel.117 These issues generally have little to do with 
the reliability of any confession that police might obtain through questioning. Thus, 
like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, these issues tend to draw defense 
attorney attention toward raising claims about process rather than about substance.118
 Miranda has also turned the attention of trial judges away from questions of the 
reliability of confessions and toward questions about police compliance with the 
Miranda rules. As Professor White has observed, before Miranda reliability “played 
an important role in our constitutional jurisprudence . . . . [Since Miranda], however, 
courts and legal commentators have largely ignored issues relating to untrustworthy 
confessions.”119 To be sure, as a matter of black letter law, the Miranda procedural 
requirements were piled on top of traditional voluntariness requirements. But as a 
practical matter, judicial attention is a scarce resource. Miranda has created a triumph 
of formalism.120 Prioritizing one set of claims (Miranda compliance) has inevitably 
reduced scrutiny of the others—to the disadvantage of innocent defendants.
 One last injury to the innocent defendants is worth noting. Good reasons exist 
for believing that Miranda has significantly hampered the ability of police officers to 
obtain confessions from guilty criminals.121 This has not only harmed law 
enforcement’s ability to convict guilty criminals but also the opportunity of innocent 
individuals to use those confessions to exonerate themselves.122 For example, Professor 
115. See id. at 539–40.
116. Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Report to the Attorney General on the Law 
of Pretrial Interrogation 97–98 (1986), reprinted in 22 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 437 (1989).
117. See 39 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Pro. 1, 179–99 (2010) (collecting approximately 400 recent federal 
court of appeals cases on Miranda issues).
118. See Stuntz, supra note 107, at 44 (advancing the argument that Miranda doctrine causes shift of attention 
away from defendants with factual issues to raise and toward defendants with procedure claims to raise). 
119. Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Unworthy Confessions, 32 
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105, 156 (1997).
120. Joseph D. Grano, Confessions, Truth and the Law 206–16 (1996).
121. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 387 
(1996); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s 
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1055 (1998); Cassell & Hayman, supra note 20. 
These conclusions are not universally accepted. Compare John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish 
Police Effectiveness?, 50 Stan. L Rev. 1147 (1998) (critiquing the validity of the data used to correlate 
Miranda with diminished clearance), with Paul G. Cassell, Falling Clearance Rates After Miranda: 
Coincidence or Consequence?, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1181 (1998) (responding to these criticisms).
122. See Cassell, supra note 62, at 550–52.
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Gross has noted that the number of exonerations when the actual criminal confessed 
declined sometime between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s.123 Gross cites among 
the possible causes the Miranda decision, which “may result in some reduction in the 
number of confessions.”124 Thus, by impairing the system’s ability to get to the truth 
in cases, Miranda has caused the innocent to suffer.
 A system that respects the constitutional right against self-incrimination while at 
the same time providing greater protection for innocent suspects could be easily 
designed. There appears to be wide agreement that videorecording interrogations 
would offer far greater protection for innocent suspects than does the current Miranda 
regime.125 I made a proposal long ago for substituting videorecording of police 
questioning as a substitute for Miranda.126 Others have proposed that recording 
should supplement Miranda.127 A fair number of jurisdictions are moving forward 
with requiring videorecording of at least some interrogations,128 although recording 
is often left to the discretion of police officers or mandated only for very serious 
crimes. The innocence movement could speed the adoption of this important reform 
if they would highlight the extent to which Miranda does not offer effective 
protection to the innocent and suggest that, instead, we should use videorecording.
 G.  Barring Prisoners from Filing a Petition for Federal (or State) Habeas Corpus 
Review Unless They Present a Colorable Claim of Factual Innocence
 As noted above, one of the great problems for the innocence movement is trying 
to find the needles in a large haystack—that is, trying to identify innocent persons in 
a criminal justice system that processes mostly guilty defendants.129 Some 
commentators have made a frontal assault on this problem by directly proposing that 
we limit access to some forms of judicial review to those who are making claims of 
actual innocence. For example, two distinguished legal scholars—Joseph L. 
Hoffmann and Nancy J. King—recently proposed that federal habeas corpus review 
of noncapital state court convictions and sentences should, with narrow exceptions, 
be abolished except for those who couple a constitutional claim with “clear and 
123. Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. Legal Stud. 395, 
430–31 (1987).
124. Id. at 431. For reasons to think that Miranda is the most likely cause of this drop in confessions, see 
Cassell & Fowles, supra note 121, at 1107–20.
125. See Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed It, How We Got It—
and What Happened to It, 5 Ohio. St. J. Crim. L. 163, 189–90 (2007).
126. See Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs, supra note 121, at 486–92.
127. See, e.g., Lisa Lewis, Rethinking Miranda: Truth, Lies, and Videotape, 43 Gonz. L. Rev. 199 (2007); Lisa 
C. Oliver, Mandatory Recording of Custodial Interrogations Nationwide: Recommending a New Model Code, 
39 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 263 (2005).
128. Alan M. Gershel, A Review of the Law in Jurisdictions Requiring Electronic Recording of Custodial 
Interrogations, 16 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 9 (2010).
129. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
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convincing proof of actual innocence.”130 Relying on a comprehensive study of federal 
habeas corpus filings,131 they found that only seven of the 2384 noncapital habeas 
filings in the study (0.29%) resulted in a grant of habeas relief, and one of those 
seven was later reversed on appeal.132 Hoffman and King argued that habeas review 
of such claims “currently squanders resources while failing to remedy defense attorney 
deficiencies. Those resources should be redeployed where they have a more 
meaningful chance of preventing the deficiencies in the first place.”133 They propose 
moving resources to indigent defense representation instead of largely pointless 
habeas litigation.
 Hoffmann and King’s proposal is similar to others that have tried to focus habeas 
corpus on protecting the innocent. Most famously, Judge Henry Friendly argued that 
federal habeas relief for most constitutional errors should be conditioned on a 
showing of innocence.134 Interestingly, he also proposed that a suff icient 
demonstration of innocence should itself be a basis for habeas relief,135 an issue that 
has bedeviled the Supreme Court in recent years.136 Similarly, Professors John C. 
Jeffries, Jr. and William J. Stuntz have suggested allowing defaulted federal claims to 
be raised in federal habeas where those claims raise a reasonable probability that the 
defaulted claims resulted in an erroneous conviction.137 All of these ideas have the 
benefit of focusing an important part of the criminal justice system—federal habeas 
corpus review—on the central issue of innocence.
 Hoffmann and King’s proposal to restrict habeas corpus has been attacked, 
perhaps most extensively, by Professor John Blume and his colleagues.138 But 
interestingly enough, their critique relies heavily on the case of an allegedly innocent 
130. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 791, 820 (2009).
131. Nancy J. King et al., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts 
(2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf.
132. Id. at 52, 58, 115–16.
133. Hoffman & King, supra note 130, at 823.
134. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi L. Rev. 
143 (1970).
135. Id. at 167.
136. See Joshua M. Lott, Note, The End of Innocence? Federal Habeas Corpus Law After In re Davis, 27 Ga. St. 
U. L. Rev. 443 (2011). The Supreme Court has stated that “the existence merely of newly discovered 
evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.” 
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)). 
Nonetheless, there has been enough uncertainty about that statement that at least 173 freestanding 
innocence claims have since been filed in federal habeas courts. See Nicholas Berg, Turning a Blind Eye 
to Innocence: The Legacy of Herrera v. Collins, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 121, 131 (2005).
137. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas 
Corpus, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 679 (1990).
138. See, e.g., John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffmann and King, 96 
Cornell L. Rev. 435 (2011).
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habeas petitioner139—the very kind of petitioner that Hoffmann and King would try 
to protect. Blume and his colleagues go on to argue that federal habeas plays an 
important role in correcting errors at trial. Given the miniscule number of cases in 
which relief is granted, it is difficult to credit that view. But the larger point that is 
worth thinking about for those who believe innocence is the most important value in 
our criminal justice system is whether we can focus our legal institutions (such as 
federal habeas) on the interests of the innocent.140 At the end of the day, it does seem 
more likely that the innocent will benefit from a system concentrating on them—that 
is, that we can find needles more effectively in smaller haystacks.
 H.  Requiring All Defense Attorneys to Directly Ask Their Clients,“Did You Commit 
the Crime?” and Aggressively Investigate Claims of Actual Innocence
 It is finally worth considering what additional role defense attorneys might be 
able to play in preventing convictions of the innocent. Like the great bulk of the 
innocence literature, Bakken’s proposals aim to focus prosecutors on the plight of 
innocent defendants. But prosecutors are not the only actors in the criminal justice 
system who may occasionally need such reorientation. It appears that defense 
attorneys, too, may bear some of the responsibility for miscarriages of justice.
 The mindset of the defense bar toward the question of whether their clients are 
in fact guilty has been described as one of “staggering indifference.”141 Defense 
attorneys simply cannot pay any attention to whether their clients are guilty, it is 
argued, because doing so would impair the quality of the representation they 
provide.142 I am not convinced. Particularly if we want to structure an innocentric 
criminal justice system that gives top priority to preventing the conviction of the 
innocent, defense attorneys must be involved. Indeed, defense attorneys, who have 
direct access to defendants, may be uniquely positioned to identify a miscarriage of 
justice before it happens and take steps to prevent it.
 Here is one example of how we might think about reorienting defense attorneys 
toward innocence issues. Earlier in this article, I noted that many defense attorneys 
do not directly ask their clients whether they are guilty of the crime charged. This 
ignorance may permit defense attorneys to perhaps raise defenses that might 
otherwise be barred by rules of legal ethics.143 But why should we give defense counsel 
139. Id. at 436–40 (discussing the rape conviction of Clarence Moore, which was overturned in Moore v. 
Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 102 (3d Cir. 2001)). It is not clear whether Blume and his colleagues believe that 
Moore was actually innocent or simply convicted on inadequate evidence.
140. For an interesting effort along these lines in the area of direct appeals, see Helen A. Anderson, Revising 
Harmless Error: Making Innocence Relevant to Direct Appeals, 17 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 391 (2011).
141. Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 Clev. St. L. Rev. 175, 180 (1983).
142. See Mosteller, supra note 13. 
143. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(3). But cf. Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer’s 
“Different Mission”: Reflections on the “Right” to Present a False Case, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 125 (1987) 
(suggesting that there are few limits on the defense and criticizing this view). See generally discussion 
supra Part I.C.
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such freedom if we are trying to structure a criminal justice system that focuses on 
innocence? It is hard to see what larger societal interest is served by allowing counsel 
to move forward in ignorance of this important fact. It may be true, as Professor 
Mosteller argues, that defense attorneys can never be sure whether their client is 
telling the truth when a defendant claims to be innocent.144 But at least requiring 
defense attorneys to ask the question might serve the valuable function of putting 
this issue squarely out in the open and helping them to play their role in sorting the 
guilty from the innocent.
 Simply requiring the defense attorney to ask a perfunctory question probably 
would not make much of a change in the current system. Part of the current criminal 
justice game seems to be for defendants to deny their involvement in a crime—at 
least at the start of a case. For example, Professor Mosteller reports that, when he 
was a defense attorney, virtually all of his clients claimed to be innocent until he 
recited the advantages of a specific plea offer; at that point, they conceded their 
guilt.145 In light of this fact, maybe defense attorneys should be required not only to 
ask their clients if they committed the crime but to also explore more thoroughly 
whether a defendant is truly guilty or innocent. This requirement must be enforced 
by a rule that only if a defendant admits he is guilty would a defense attorney be 
permitted to explore a standard plea bargain.146 Such a requirement might promote 
more frank and open discussion between defense attorneys and their clients about 
whether they were involved in the crime.
 Forcing defense attorneys to truly attempt to learn whether their clients are guilty 
or innocent would create a real advantage: it would give the criminal justice system 
one more opportunity to begin sorting innocent defendants from guilty ones through 
the one person who has the best access to important information—the defendant. 
Professor Mosteller may complain about how defense attorneys have difficulties 
obtaining access to witnesses and other forms of evidence,147 but the barriers to 
information are not all one-sided. Prosecutors are usually precluded from talking to 
defendants once legal counsel enters the scene. But defendants are in a unique 
position to provide information that can sort the guilty from the innocent. If 
defendants can be induced to provide more thorough information to their attorneys 
about whether they are innocent or guilty, then the system can more effectively 
protect against wrongful conviction.
 With the innocence issue directly on the table for discussion, how should defense 
counsel proceed when her client reports that he is innocent? Professor Mosteller 
rightly bristles at the suggestion that there should be some sort of “second-class 
144. See Mosteller, supra note 13, at 41.
145. See Mosteller, supra note 109, at 954.
146. A defense attorney could still explore an Alford plea for an “innocent” defendant. See North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). But typically the sort of concessions that prosecutors are willing to offer for 
such a plea are less than that offered for a full-blown guilty plea.
147. See Mosteller, supra note 109, at 941–43 (discussing “limited defense access to witnesses and evidence”).
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treatment” of defendants who state clearly that they are guilty.148 He explains quite 
nicely that defense counsel have important duties to perform in the criminal justice 
system, even when performing the far more common duty of defending those who 
have in fact committed the crimes charged against them. But he interestingly goes 
on to discuss the idea that perhaps individual defense attorneys—or even perhaps the 
criminal justice system in general—should try to devote additional resources to cases 
in which a defendant has a good claim of actual innocence.149 Of course, defense 
attorneys—and the system—are not well positioned to do this if the defendant is not 
even asked whether he is in fact innocent. Posing the question is at least a start to 
identifying those who may be wrongfully ensnared in the criminal justice system.
 If a defendant claims to be innocent, as a first step defense counsel obviously 
ought to adequately investigate the claim. Presumably adequate defense investigation 
happens in most cases, regardless of whether a defendant claims to be innocent or 
guilty. But if some defense attorneys are not squarely raising the innocence issue 
because they think ignorance is tactically useful, they may end up missing a chance 
to discover exculpatory evidence that could set a defendant free.150
 Following such an investigation, defense counsel should obviously rely on the 
procedures available in our criminal justice system for presenting a defense. For 
reasons discussed earlier in this article, I am skeptical of proposals (like Bakken’s) for 
tinkering with the traditional structure of a criminal trial. Within that traditional 
structure, defense attorneys have many tools that they can employ in the defense of 
innocent clients.
 But in reviewing cases of wrongful conviction over the years, one omission from 
the defense repertoire has always puzzled me. I have always wondered why, in a rare 
case where a defense attorney believes she is representing a truly innocent client, she 
almost invariably fails to bring the prosecutor into the discussion. The wrongful 
conviction literature contains suggests it is almost unheard of for a defense attorney 
to communicate her specific concerns directly to a prosecutor. Perhaps this is part of 
a larger culture of distrust between prosecutors and defense attorneys that appears to 
aff lict at least some jurisdictions. But direct communication on this issue needs to be 
strongly encouraged.
 It would, of course, be naive to think that defense counsel reports to prosecutors 
could prevent every wrongful conviction of an innocent defendant. But I am surprised 
to discover that defense counsel so rarely employ this approach. Perhaps an 
unfortunate reason is that defense attorneys behave in the way that Mosteller 
suggests: they simply do not view their job as having much to do with guilt or 
innocence.151 If defense attorneys proceed in this way, they never learn whether they 
148. Mosteller, supra note 13, at 7. 
149. Id. at 68–69.
150. See Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 485, 510 (2000) (reporting an example of a 
seemingly delusional defendant blaming thefts on a “chicken man”; defense investigation discovers that 
man in a chicken suit perpetrated the crimes).
151. Mosteller, supra note 13, at 60–64; accord Babcock, supra note 141, at 180.
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have an innocent defendant for a client as opposed to a guilty one. This agnostic 
approach may help to avoid burnout on the job or allow for an increased feeling of 
self-worth, as some have argued in justification.152 But at the end of the day, this is a 
cop-out, leading the innocence movement to point fingers exclusively at errant 
prosecutors and rogue police officers while ignoring the role of ignorant defense 
attorneys. If we wish to leave no stone unturned in our efforts to prevent conviction 
of the innocent, it is time to broaden our perspective on those who may be 
responsible.153
III. CONCLUSION
 This article has proceeded from the assumption that preventing wrongful 
conviction of the innocent is the top priority of our criminal justice system. But it is 
obviously not the only goal of the system. Reform proposals to protect the innocent 
must accordingly be assessed for their effect on all of the goals of the system, including 
most obviously any interference they will cause to prosecutors’ efforts to convict 
guilty criminals.
 Professor Bakken’s reform proposals suffer from a myopic focus on preventing 
the conviction of innocent persons. The upshot is that if his scheme was implemented 
in this country, it would likely block the convictions of at least tens of thousands of 
dangerous criminals every year, causing grave harm to public safety. The main 
problem lurking in the proposals is that they offer no real safeguard against guilty 
criminals taking advantage of them. Without a check on such abuse, reform proposals 
like the ones Bakken offers will likely be cures worse than the disease.
 But there are other proposals for making innocence a greater priority in our 
criminal justice system that do not suffer from these trade-offs. I have tried to sketch 
out a few such possibilities in this article, including replacing the exclusionary rule 
with a civil damage remedy, moving confession law away from Miranda procedures 
and toward videorecording of interrogations, confining habeas relief to those with 
claims of factual innocence, and requiring defense attorneys to explore their clients’ 
guilt or innocence. Ideas such as these can help prevent the conviction of innocent 
persons without interfering with the conviction of the guilty. I hope that the 
innocence movement will be true to its professed claim that innocence should be an 
overriding concern of our criminal justice system and add its support to proposals 
such as these.
 
152. See generally Barbara A. Babcock, Book Review, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 310, 315 (1985).
153. One way to hold defense attorneys accountable for wrongful convictions would be through civil suits 
against them. Recent cases seem to be broadening defense liability in this area. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. 
Bulson, 915 N.Y.S.2d 778 (4th Dep’t 2010) (nonpecuniary loss damages are available for criminal 
defendant’s loss of liberty due to attorney malpractice); cf. Kevin Bennardo, Note, A Defense Bar: The 
“Proof of Innocence” Requirement in Criminal Malpractice Claims, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 341 (2007) 
(proposing that defendants should not be required to prove that they are innocent to proceed with 
criminal malpractice claims).
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APPENDIX – DATA SOURCES FOR THE NATIONAL CRIME FUNNEL
 The “crime funnel” presented in Table 1 of the article rests on the following 
sources.
Source for Total Estimated Offenses:
Michael Rand & Shannan Catalano, Ph.D., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization, 2006, at 3, 
tbl.2, NCJ 219413 (2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv06.pdf. 
This figure excludes murder, but the proportion of murder within all violent 
crimes is extremely small and therefore not enough to meaningfully distort 
the crime funnel picture.
Source for Total Reported Offenses:
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime 
Report: Crime in the United States, 2006: Violent Crime (2007), 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/documents/violentcrimemain.pdf. While 
this figure includes murder, the proportion of murder within all violent crimes 
is extremely small and therefore not enough to meaningfully distort the crime 
funnel picture.
Source for Total Cleared Offenses:
The figure for Total Cleared Offenses was compiled by multiplying total 
reported violent crimes by the percent of offenses cleared. See U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Report, Crime 
in the United States, 2006: Clearances (2007), http://www2.fbi.gov/
ucr/cius2006/documents/clearancemain.pdf (showing that in 2006, 44.3% of 
violent crimes were cleared by arrest or exceptional means).
Source for Total Convictions:
For a compilation of state and federal violent crime convictions, see Sean 
Rosenmerkel et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006: Statistical Tables, at 9, 
tbl.1.6, NCJ 226846 (2009) (revised on Nov. 22, 2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf.
Source for Total Imprisoned Offenders:
See Sean Rosenmerkel et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006: Statistical 
Tables 5, tbl.1.2.1, 9, tbl.1.6 (2009) (revised on Nov. 22, 2010), http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf. This figure is compiled by multiplying 
the total amount of federal violent crime convictions by the percent of federal 
felons sentenced to prison (Table 1.6), and then adding that figure to the total 
amount of state violent crime felons sentenced to prison (Table 1.2.1).
